




Problem Definition

Conventional DNN Watermarking methods



Problem Statements

1. Protection on DNN is urgently needed
2. Existing watermarking approaches are vulnerable to ambiguity attack



Watermark Approach	Real Watermark	Fake Watermark
White-box (Uchida et al. [1])	100% watermark detected	100% watermark detected
Black-box (Adi et al. [2])	100% watermark detected	100% watermark detected


Watermark detection rate for both real and fake watermarks

Protect your DNN models from theft!


Protected Model → Code & More Details

Our Solution

Passporting Layer



Embedding Passport



Contributions

1. Novel passport-based verification schemes to defeat ambiguity attack
2. One passport-protected DNN model will only have one unique signature
3. Fake passport or modified signature will paralyze the DNN model


Discussion

Embedding Binary Signatures into γ of Passporting Layer

$$\text{Sign Loss} = \sum_{i=1}^C \max(\gamma_0 - \gamma_i b_i, 0)$$


$\gamma_0 = 0.1$
 $b: [-1 \ 1 \ \dots]$

64 channels can embed 8 bytes signature



Experimental Results

Ambiguity attack	Inference Phase	Verification Phase
Fake ₁ (random passport)	Random guessing	Useless Infringement
Fake ₂ (reverse-engineered passport)	Performance deteriorated (at best 70% on CIFAR10)	Useless Infringement
Fake ₃ (copied passport)	Performance Detained Signature Detected	Ownership Verified



Ownership Verification Schemes

	Scheme 1	Scheme 2	Scheme 3
Need to distribute passport	Yes	No	No
Inference time	Up to 10%** more time	No extra time	No extra time
Training time	Up to 30%** more time	Up to 150%** more time	Up to 150%** more time
Black or White box Verification	White	White	Black & White

**Time increases are linearly depending on complexity of the network architecture